The Department of War released a Post Quantum Cryptography Strategy on June 23, 2026, in which it required every department system to support post-quantum cryptography by December 31, 2030, or be phased out, unless the strategy notes otherwise. Kirsten Davies, the department’s chief information officer, announced the 25-page strategy one day after President Donald Trump signed an executive order on post-quantum migration for federal agencies.
Post-quantum cryptography, or PQC, refers to algorithms designed to resist attacks by future quantum computers. By December 31, 2031, “all DoW systems must use PQC, unless otherwise noted,” the department wrote.
For vendors, the department ruled out quantum key distribution for quantum resistance and will count an upgrade as fully PQC only if it includes post-quantum authentication. In quantum key distribution (QKD), two parties derive shared encryption keys from quantum states of light sent between them.
Davies signed the undated foreword, in which she wrote that “this critical PQC migration is not without challenges” and that “nearly every deployed military asset will be affected in some way.”
Systems and tracks
The department set out a vision in which “all DoW NSS and all non-NSSs employ interoperable, agile, secure, and post quantum cryptographic systems.” National security systems, or NSS, include the government’s intelligence, military command, and classified systems.
The department organized the work into five lines of effort, titled “Optimize DoW Governance,” “Baseline Inventory and Plan,” “Develop and Analyze,” “Integrate Commercial Solutions,” and “Deploy Quantum Resistant Devices.”
For PQC, national security systems “must support Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0,” known as CNSA 2.0, the department wrote. CNSA 2.0 is the set of algorithms that the National Security Agency (NSA) approves for those systems, including post-quantum ones.
The department split the work into two tracks. It wrote that in the High Assurance track “all ECUs are dependent on the NSA Key Management Infrastructure” and that the NSA must certify every high-assurance device.
End cryptographic units, or ECUs, are military encryption devices such as secure radios and network encryptors. The Key Management Infrastructure is the NSA’s system for producing and distributing the keys those devices use.
The department wrote that its Commercial Solutions track is “largely dependent on the commercial adoption and integration of NIST PQC Algorithms within commodity IT” used by its systems. NIST’s post-quantum standards include ML-KEM, formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber, for key establishment and ML-DSA, formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium, for digital signatures.
In key establishment, two parties agree on a secret key to encrypt their communications. With a digital signature, a recipient can check who produced a message or a software file and that no one has altered it.
What the department will not accept
Solutions that migrate only confidentiality, without PQC authentication, “will not be considered fully PQC,” the department wrote. “Quantum resistance is not achieved when PQC is rolled out but when quantum-vulnerable solutions are deprecated,” it added.
A cryptographically relevant quantum computer, or CRQC, is one large enough to break the public-key cryptography in use today. Solutions that use CRQC-vulnerable algorithms with longer key sizes “will not be considered fully quantum resistant,” the department wrote. Any of those that cannot be updated to PQC algorithms must be phased out and replaced by December 31, 2030, except where otherwise noted.
QKD, quantum networking, and non-local quantum randomness generation “should not be used as security solutions for quantum resistance,” the department wrote.
Outside high-assurance uses, the department will not count symmetric key protocols or pre-shared keys as fully quantum resistant. In symmetric key protocols, both parties use the same secret key to encrypt and decrypt. Pre-shared keys are secret keys loaded into devices in advance. The rule concerns which methods count toward the department’s migration requirement. NIST treats its symmetric standards, such as AES, as far less exposed to known quantum attacks than RSA or elliptic-curve schemes.
The department will phase out such solutions by December 31, 2030, except where otherwise noted. Department components will not test, pilot, use, or procure them for quantum resistance.
Contractors and the executive order
The defense industrial base is the network of companies that supply the military. The department wrote that it will ensure the defense industrial base “migrates to PQC across the enterprise” to protect department information on contractor systems.
The department also plans to update the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) “to include requirements for PQC” and to move external certificate authorities to PQC certificates. Under CMMC, contractors must meet cybersecurity requirements to win department contracts. Certificate authorities issue the digital certificates that systems use to prove their identities.
In its release, the department called preparing contractors “for upcoming Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) cryptographic compliance” a key element of its push for industry collaboration. The FAR Council maintains that regulation, the rulebook for most federal purchasing. Under Section 6(c) of Trump’s order, the council must propose a rule by December 19, 2026, under which covered contractors would comply with NIST’s standards, including those for PQC algorithms, by December 31, 2030.
In the same release, the department described “a rapid, enterprise-wide transition to deploy quantum-resistant cryptography on high-impact systems by 2030 and across the entire force by 2031.” It said it would “accelerate ahead of the timelines set by Executive Order 14409,” the number of a separate June 2 order on artificial intelligence.
The Federal Register published that order, “Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks,” as Executive Order 14412 on June 25. In it, Trump directed the Office of Management and Budget to require agencies to move high value assets and high impact systems to post-quantum key establishment by December 31, 2030, and to post-quantum signatures by December 31, 2031.
Trump defined a high impact system as one in which confidentiality, integrity, or availability is rated high under FIPS 199, a NIST standard for categorizing federal systems. High value assets are federal information or systems designated as such under OMB guidance.
